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I. INTRODUCTION 
Gestational surrogacy provides a pathway to parenthood for those 
who otherwise may not be able to conceive children. At the core of the 
gestational surrogacy process are contracts, which provide predictability 
and security between the parties in a gestational surrogacy arrangement 
by defining the parties’ rights, responsibilities, and expectations. When 
contracts are breached, the parties rely upon the courts and other 
enforcement mechanisms to enforce them. However, surrogacy 
agreements are not enforceable in all United States (“U.S.”)  
jurisdictions, leaving contracting parties vulnerable to unexpected 
outcomes. The Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), updated in 2017 from 
its earlier 1973 and 2002 versions, attempts to provide states with a 
uniform statutory framework to govern the surrogacy process.1 This 
paper evaluates the enforceability of gestational surrogacy agreement 
provisions, based upon current drafting practices under the UPA (2017), 
constitutional law, and contract law principles. Based on this evaluation, 
this paper also recommends changes to current drafting practices to 
ensure the enforceability of gestational surrogacy agreements. 
Behind every gestational surrogacy arrangement are people who 
desire to conceive children of their own or for others. A variety of 
contracts facilitate the creation of this new family. The surrogacy process 
may involve contracts between the surrogate, surrogacy agency, fertility 
clinic, gamete providers, intended parents, and attorneys.2 These 
contracts cover issues such as payment to the donor, surrogate, and 
agency; waiver of claims regarding medical procedures, like in vitro 
fertilization (“IVF”); and the responsibilities, parental rights, and duties 
pertaining to any child born through surrogacy.3 The contract between 
the intended parents and the gestational surrogate is known as a 
surrogacy agreement, which will be the focus of this paper. 
Contracts govern the relationship between intended parents and 
surrogates by balancing the interests and safety of gestational carriers, 
intended parents, and the children conceived. An intended parent is a 
person who commissions a woman to carry a child and becomes the legal 
parent of the child. A gestational surrogate is a woman who agrees to 
become pregnant, using donor sperm and egg, through IVF.4 
                                                                                                                                     
 1 See generally, Uniform Parentage Act (2017). 
 2 See generally Joseph F. Morrissey, Surrogacy: The Process, The Law, and The 
Contracts, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 459, 472-76 (2015). 
 3 Id. 
 4 See Uniform Parentage Act § 801(2) (2017). 
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Gestational surrogacy is one of two forms of surrogacy. The other 
form of surrogacy is referred to as “traditional” surrogacy. In a 
traditional surrogacy arrangement, conception occurs through alternative 
insemination with sperm from the intended parent, meaning that the 
surrogate is also the child’s genetic mother.5 The surrogate’s egg is 
usually fertilized using alternative insemination.6 With alternative 
insemination, a doctor uses a syringe to inseminate the surrogate with the 
sperm of the intended father or donor.7 Traditional surrogacy results in a 
child who is genetically related to the surrogate and is usually the 
husband of the intended mother. 
In contrast, a child born of gestational surrogacy is not genetically 
related to the surrogate.  An egg—provided by the intended mother or a 
third party—is fertilized with the sperm of the intended father or donor 
through IVF.8 The fertilized egg creates an embryo, which is then 
transferred to the surrogate’s uterus.9 Despite the higher costs and 
technical complexity of gestational surrogacy, it is the most common 
form of surrogacy practiced in the U.S. and best protects the parenthood 
claims of the intended parents because the child is not genetically related 
to the surrogate.10 
Generally, family law presumes that genetic parents have custodial 
and parental rights.11 Moreover, family law presumes that a husband is 
the legal father of a child born to his wife.12  These two presumptions 
create problems for traditional surrogacy arrangements, in that they treat 
the surrogate as the legal mother and the surrogate’s husband as the legal 
father. For this reason, traditional surrogacy is rarely practiced in the 
U.S.13 
States are divided on how to govern gestational surrogacy. This 
division is due, in part, to the controversial nature of surrogacy. Since 
surrogacy agreements are often interstate transactions, parties frequently 
forum shop to take advantage of favorable laws. The UPA (revised in 
2000 and amended 2002 to add provisions regarding surrogacy) sought 
to prevent forum shopping and ensure consistent results across state 
                                                                                                                                     
 5 See Morrissey, supra note 2, at 473-476. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES 29 (Beacon Press, 2015). 
 11 See generally Morrissey, supra note 2, at 471. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Ertman, supra note 10, at 29. 
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lines.14 However, states were slow to enact the UPA (2002).15 As of July 
2017, only two states16 enacted the surrogacy provisions of the UPA 
(2002). The Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”)17 revised the UPA 
again in 2017 to reflect developments in the area of surrogacy.18 The 
process outlined in the UPA (2017) for ensuring legal enforceability of 
gestational surrogacy agreements is less burdensome for intended parents 
and surrogates, and better reflects how gestational surrogacy is currently 
practiced.19 As of this writing, California, Vermont, and Washington 
have enacted the UPA (2017), and Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and 
Rhode Island are considering enactment.20 
Modeled from existing state statutes,21 the UPA (2017) could be a 
better solution for a uniform statutory framework that promotes the legal 
recognition of surrogacy agreements. The new statutory framework 
attempts to conform to current surrogacy practices22 and quell the 
controversy surrounding surrogacy. In light of the changes to the UPA, 
attorneys should consider augmenting their drafting practices to ensure 
conformity with the UPA (2017).  Section I of this paper discusses the 
factual and legal development of surrogacy in the U.S. Section II 
provides an overview of the 1973 version of the UPA, and its 2002 and 
2017 revisions. Section II also evaluates the enforceability of standard 
gestational surrogacy agreement provisions under the UPA (2017) by 
considering potential statutory and constitutional challenges, as well as 
contract law defenses against enforceability. Section II provides 
recommendations to practitioners, based on the UPA (2017)’s statutory 
                                                                                                                                     
 14 See generally Uniform Parentage Act (2002). 
 15 See Uniform Parentage Act, art. 8 cmt. (2017). 
 16 As of July 2017, only Texas and Utah have enacted surrogacy provisions based on 
Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act (2002). See id. 
 17 The Uniform Law Commission is a group of practicing lawyers, judges, 
legislators, and law professors who have been appointed by state governments to provide 
states with non-partisan legislation that brings clarity and uniformity to areas of state 
statutory law. About Us, ULC, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2021). 
 18 See generally Uniform Parentage Act § 801-18 (2017). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Parentage Act, ULC https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-
home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f,  (last visited Mar. 11, 
2019). 
 21 The gestational surrogacy provisions of UPA (2017) were modeled on Delaware, 
Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, District of Columbia, and Illinois surrogacy statutes. 
See Uniform Parentage Act, art. 8 cmt. (2017). 
 22 In a number of states, intended parents are immediately recognized as the legal 
parents of a child resulting from a surrogacy arrangement as long as the surrogacy 
agreement conforms to the state’s statutory requirements. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-404 
and CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(i) (West 2018). 
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scheme, about changes to consider in the drafting process to comply with 
the most recent changes to the UPA. Lastly, Section III summarizes 
those recommendations. 
II. GESTATIONAL SURROGACY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Changes to the UPA are a reflection, in part, of ethnological and 
legal developments in the area of surrogacy. Section II.A. of this paper 
discusses technological developments in assisted reproductive 
technology (“ART”) and how those developments led to the emergence 
of gestational surrogacy in the U.S. Section I. B. provides an overview of 
the evolution of relevant case and statutory law and discusses current 
state approaches to the enforcement and regulation of surrogacy 
agreements. 
A. Overview of Gestational Surrogacy in the United States 
Before discussing the statutes that govern the practice of surrogacy, 
it is important to understand the history of surrogacy in the U.S. 
Surrogacies in the U.S. were “traditional” until the 1990s when legal 
rules and IVF technology developed to their current state. 23 Noel Keane 
was one of the first well-known lawyers to negotiate and draft traditional 
surrogacy agreements in the U.S.24 In the 1970s, he founded the 
Infertility Centers to facilitate surrogacy arrangements.25 Mr. Keane 
arranged approximately 600 births,26 earning him the title of “father of 
surrogacy.”27 In fact, Mr. Keane was the lawyer who negotiated the 
surrogacy agreement for the traditional surrogacy arrangement at issue in 
the landmark case of In re Baby M.28 The case of Baby M was a setback 
in the social and legal acceptance of surrogacy and, as a result of the 
case, many states outlawed the practice of traditional surrogacy.29 
The 1978 birth of Louise Joy Brown paved the way for gestational 
surrogacy.30 Louise was conceived using the fertilized egg and sperm of 
her mother and father, a married couple.31 After joining the egg with the 
                                                                                                                                     
 23 See generally Ertman, supra note 10, at 27-9. 
 24 Lawrence Van Gelder, Noel Keane, 58, Lawyer in Surrogate Mother Cases, is 
Dead, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 28. 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/28/nyregion/noel-
keane-58-lawyer-in-surrogate-mother-cases-is-dead.html. 
 25 See Ertman, supra note 10, at 28. 
 26 Gelder, supra note 24. 
 27 See Ertman, supra note 10, at 28. 
 28 Id.; See generally In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 29 See Ertman, supra note 10, at 29. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
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sperm in a lab, doctors implanted the embryo into her mother’s uterus.32 
Although Louise’s birth was not the result of a surrogacy arrangement, it 
did demonstrate the feasibility of IVF—the procedure performed prior to 
implanting a fertilized egg into the gestational carrier’s uterus. The first 
successful pregnancy using a donated egg occurred in 1983.33 Just two 
years later, in 1985, the first child was born to a gestational surrogate.34 
Although surrogacy was rare just a few decades ago, the global 
surrogacy industry is now worth up to six billion dollars.35 Between 1999 
and 2013, there were 18,400 infants born in the U.S. as a result of 
surrogacy arrangements.36 
B. The Law of Surrogacy 
Case, constitutional, and statutory law has influenced the contents 
and enforceability of surrogacy agreements. These legal developments 
have all shaped today’s practice of surrogacy in the U.S. 
1. Case Law 
i. In Re Baby M (1988) 
Baby M, the landmark case on traditional surrogacy, involved two 
couples: the Sterns and the Whiteheads.37 The Sterns and Whiteheads 
entered into a surrogacy contract in 1985.38 The contract provided that 
the surrogate, Mrs. Whitehead, would become pregnant using her egg 
and Dr. William Stern’s sperm.39 This resulted in a child that was 
genetically related to both the surrogate and the intended father. After 
giving birth to the child, Mrs. Whitehead was emotionally attached to the 
child and refused to relinquish custody of the child.40 The Sterns filed for 
                                                                                                                                     
 32 Id. 
 33 See Lynn M. Squillace, Too Much of a Good Thing: Toward a Regulated Market 
in Human Eggs, 1 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 135, 137 (2005). 
 34 Alyssa James, Gestational Surrogacy Agreements: Why Indiana Should Honor 
Them and What Physicians Should Know Until They Do, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 175, 
179 (2013). 
 35 Seema Mohapatra, Achieving Reproductive Justice in the International Surrogacy 
Market, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 
191, 193 (2012). 
 36 Key Findings: Use of Gestational Carriers in the United States, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/art/key-findings/gestational-carriers.html (last visited Aug. 13, 
2018). 
 37 In In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235-38 (N.J. 1988). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 1236-37. 
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custody of the child and sought to enforce the surrogacy contract 
provision that terminated Mrs. Whitehead’s parental rights and duties, 
and made Dr. Elizabeth Stern the child’s other legal parent.41 The New 
Jersey Supreme Court refused to enforce the surrogacy contract, 
reasoning that it conflicted with adoption statutes, baby-selling statutes,42 
and public policy.43 The Court then determined the custodial rights. 
Regarding custody, the Court grounded its analysis on what it 
believed would be in the best interests of the child.44 The “best interest of 
the child” analysis is fundamental to family law disputes involving 
children. Courts employ “best interests” reasoning to make custody 
decisions with the goal of fostering the child’s needs.  In Baby M, this 
analysis led to the Court awarding custody to the intended father and his 
wife.45 However, New Jersey law required a showing of parental 
unfitness or abandonment before terminating the natural mother’s 
parental rights, who in this case was also the surrogate.46 Since that 
showing was not made, the Court restored the surrogate’s parental 
rights.47 
The result in Baby M demonstrates the court’s attempt to balance 
the interests of the child and the rights of the genetic parents. However, 
the outcome fell short of what each party contracted for and the relief 
requested. The legal, moral, and emotional complexities of the traditional 
surrogacy process, as demonstrated in Baby M, propelled legal 
prohibitions of traditional surrogacy.48  In recent years, some states have 
changed their laws to now allow traditional surrogacy;49 however, many 
states still criminalize or otherwise prohibit traditional surrogacy.50 The 
legal hostility following Baby M, coupled with technological 
                                                                                                                                     
 41 Id. at 1237-38. 
 42 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 1238-39. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 1234-35. 
 48 Ertman, supra note 10, at 29. 
 49 For example, Washington, D.C. repealed section 16-402 in 2017, which banned 
and criminalized surrogacy contracts. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402, repealed by 
Collaborative Reproduction Amendment Act of 2016. The new Act streamlines the 
surrogacy process for intended parents by allowing them to become the legal parents of a 
child resulting from a surrogacy agreement without having to initiate subsequent 
adoption proceedings. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-404 (West 2017). 
 50 See, e.g., KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (West 2021); N.D. CENT. CODE §14-
18-05 (West 2019). 
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advancements in the medical field, has rendered traditional surrogacy 
nearly obsolete in the U.S.51 
ii. Johnson v. Calvert (1993) 
Just a few years after Baby M, a California case created a safe 
harbor for people to enter and enforce surrogacy agreements. Johnson v. 
Calvert represents the first time a high state court enforced a surrogacy 
contract.52 In 1990, Mark and Crispina Calvert entered into a gestational 
surrogacy contract with Anna Johnson.53 The contract provided that the 
fertilized egg and sperm of the Calverts would be implanted into Ms. 
Johnson and that Ms. Johnson would relinquish all parental rights to the 
Calverts.54 The relationship deteriorated after the Calverts discovered 
that Ms. Johnson had several stillbirths and miscarriages and that the 
Calverts had not obtained life insurance for Ms. Johnson, as promised.55 
Ms. Johnson filed suit seeking to be declared the child’s mother, and the 
Calverts countersued to be declared the legal parents.56 
The facts diverged from Baby M 57 in one crucial respect: the child 
in Johnson v. Calvert had no genetic relation to the surrogate.58 The 
Calverts attempted to assert their parental rights based on their genetic 
relation to the child, while Ms. Johnson sought to assert her parental 
rights based upon the fact that she gave birth to the child.59  Under 
California Civil Code section 7003, a woman could establish maternity 
by proving that she is genetically related to the child or gave birth to the 
child.60 In traditional surrogacy cases, one woman both gestates and 
provides the egg, however, here, those two roles were split between 
Anna Johnson and Crispina Calvert.  The court ultimately employed the 
intended parents test—a contractual test—which provides that when the 
person who is genetically related to the child, and the person who gave 
                                                                                                                                     
 51 Ertman, supra note 10, at 29. 
 52 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
 53 Id. at 778. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See generally In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 58 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. 
 59 Id. at 779. 
 60 Id. at 795 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The now repealed statute provided that man 
may prove he is a child’s natural father through genetic marker evidence derived from 
blood testing. Id. The California statute also “permit[ted] a woman to establish that she is 
‘the natural mother’ of a child by “proof of . . . having given birth to the child.” Id. 
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birth to the child are two different people, the natural mother is the 
person who intended to procreate the child.61 
The court’s response to a wide range of public and social policy 
arguments presented against the enforcement of surrogacy agreements is 
as important as its holding. The surrogate in Johnson argued that 
gestational surrogacy contracts are unenforceable because they: (1) 
involve  a payment for a child and a pre-birth waiver of parental rights, 
prohibited under California adoption laws; (2) violate the constitutional 
prohibition on involuntary servitude; (3) exploit women of lower 
socioeconomic status; and (4) may result in the commodification of 
children.62 
Regarding the prohibition on payments in adoption, the court 
quickly dismissed that issue by noting significant differences between 
surrogacy and adoption.63 For example, the court reasoned, a gestational 
surrogate is not the genetic mother of the child she carries, and therefore 
does not waive parental rights by signing a surrogacy agreement.64 
Additionally, the court viewed payments to gestational surrogates as 
compensation for their services and not for relinquishing the child.65 
The court likewise rejected the surrogate’s claim regarding 
involuntary servitude, since “extrinsic evidence of coercion or duress 
were utterly lacking.”66 The contract at issue did include a provision 
giving the intended parents the right to make decisions regarding the 
abortion of the fetus.67 However, to the extent that the contract’s 
provisions on abortion would force the surrogate to bear or abort a 
child—a potential form of involuntary servitude—the court did not rule 
on the issue because the contract also provided that it was within the sole 
discretion of the surrogate to abort or not to abort the fetus.68 Abortion 
provisions, such as the one discussed in Johnson, are frequently used in 
surrogacy contracts.69 Abortion provisions may be disconcerting as they 
generally provide that the intended parents may request for the 
pregnancy to be terminated or the number of fetuses to be reduced. 
However, the abortion provision in the contract at issue in Johnson 
                                                                                                                                     
 61 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782. 
 62 Id. at 783-85. 
 63 Id. at 783–84. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 This information is based on a review of sample surrogacy agreements, including 
one provided by Jennifer Fairfax, Esquire. 
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included a clause that stated, ‘[a]ll parties understand that a pregnant 
woman has the absolute right to abort or not abort any fetus she is 
carrying. Any promise to the contrary is unenforceable.’70  The 
constitutional implications of abortion provisions are further discussed 
below. 
The court then addressed the appellant’s argument that surrogacy 
contracts tend to exploit women of lower socioeconomic status. The 
court acknowledged that women of lower-socioeconomic status are more 
likely to enter into surrogacy agreements.71 However, the court was not 
persuaded that surrogacy contracts influenced women to pursue 
surrogacy any less than they might be persuaded to accept an otherwise 
low paying job.72 The court also rejected the argument that surrogacy 
exploits women by pointing out the lack of data to support this 
proposition.73 
Another paramount concern addressed by the court is the 
commodification of children.74 Some fear that the exchange of surrogacy 
services for compensation will transform the procreation of children into 
a commercial enterprise, thus creating a “baby-selling” market. Again, 
the court rejected this argument by pointing out the lack of data to 
support the proposition that children will be treated as commodities.75 On 
the contrary, the court found limited data that showed an absence of an 
adverse effect on all parties in a surrogacy arrangement, including 
children.76 Following the lead of Johnson v. Calvert, courts in the U.S. 
began enforcing surrogacy agreements citing the rationale used in the 
case.77 
2. Constitutional Cases Influencing Surrogacy Agreements 
The Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on surrogacy, however, 
there have been decisions relating to one’s right to privacy and the right 
to marry that has legal consequences on the legality of surrogacy 
agreements and laws. Roe v. Wade, Obergefell v. Hodges, and Pavan v. 
                                                                                                                                     
 70 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784. 
 71 Id. at 785. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 785. 
 77 See, e.g., C.M. v. M.C., 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 351 (Ct. App. 2017); P.M. v. T.B., 907 
N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 2018). 
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Smith, have all shaped the contents and enforcement of surrogacy 
agreements and laws.78 
Like the agreement at issue in Johnson, many surrogacy agreements 
contain abortion provisions. When the enforceability of a surrogacy 
agreement is challenged, such provisions trigger a constitutional analysis 
as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade. Decided in 
1973, Roe v. Wade arguably limits the ability of intended parents to 
compel surrogates to terminate or maintain a pregnancy.79 Roe v. Wade 
implicated the constitutionality of a Texas law criminalizing abortions.80 
The Supreme Court held that the decision of whether to continue or 
terminate a pregnancy in the first trimester fell within the right of privacy 
and therefore struck down the law as unconstitutional.81 Due to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe, intended parents are prohibited from 
forcing surrogates to terminate a pregnancy.82 Instead, intended parents 
utilize surrogacy agreements to outline the conditions under which the 
parties may request the surrogate to terminate the pregnancy and provide 
for monetary remedies if the agreed-upon conditions are not met.83 
                                                                                                                                     
 78 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 
(2015); Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017). 
 79 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 For example, below is a sample abortion and selective reduction provided by an 
attorney. 
Abortion And Selective Reduction Provision: 
The Gestational Carrier has a Constitutional right to abort or not abort any child she is 
carrying and cannot waive such a right. However, she agrees not to abort the pregnancy 
except for medical reasons placing the Gestational Carrier’s life or health at risk, if 
recommended by the attending OB/GYN physician and only after prior consultation with 
the Intended Parents unless a medical emergency prevents such prior consultation. 
Moreover, if her life or health is not at risk and she aborts the Child contrary to the 
wishes of the Intended Parents then she will be in breach of this Agreement and will be 
considered a material breach subject to the damages set out in the next paragraph. If there 
is adequate time, the Intended Parents may choose to engage a second consulting 
physician or specialist; however, if the opinion of the Gestational Carrier’s OB/GYN 
physician is that the Gestational Carrier’s life and health are at imminent risk unless an 
abortion occurs, then that attending OB/GYN Physician’s decision shall govern. 
If the Gestational Carrier aborts the fetus contrary to the medical opinion as defined 
above and contrary to the desires of the Intended Parents, the Gestational Carrier agrees 
to pay to the Intended Parents a sum of money equal to the expenses already paid by the 
Intended Parents including, but not limited to, all legal and medical expenses, fertility 
clinic fees and all fees and expenses paid to the Gestational Carrier with respect to this 
Agreement. This shall include, but not be limited to, any medical expenses incurred by 
the Intended Parents in relation to proceeding with the embryo creation and transfer 
process. 
 
2021]Gestational Surrogacy Under the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act 13 
Constitutional cases regarding same-sex marriages are also relevant 
to surrogacy. Obergefell v. Hodges and Pavan v. Smith, which both 
concerned the legal treatment of same-sex marriages, have shaped state 
definitions of marriage.84 A state’s legal definition of marriage is relevant 
to surrogacy because some states only allow married couples to enter 
into surrogacy agreements.85 If a state’s legal definition of marriage 
excludes same-sex couples, then same-sex couples, by definition, are 
prohibited from entering into a surrogacy agreement. For example, 
Virginia restricts the practice of surrogacy to married couples.86 
Additionally, Virginia defines intended parents as “a man and a woman, 
                                                                                                                                     
The Gestational Carrier agrees to undergo an abortion at the request of the Intended 
Parents, which request the Intended Parents may make if the treating physician advises 
that the Child has identified a very low IQ mental deficiency or has medical issues that 
are incompatible with life outside the womb or otherwise such severe and significant 
defects to the point that the child’s or children’s quality of life would be affected and/or 
cause suffering (a painful life or eventual death) and understands this is a material term. 
The Gestational Carrier shall not undergo the medical procedures for selective reduction 
without prior notification to and consultation with the Intended Parents unless the 
attending physician believes the Gestational Carrier’s life is endangered. Intended Parents 
shall not request that the Gestational Carrier have a selective reduction unless she is 
carrying more than 2 fetuses or unless there is a severe or significant handicap, 
deformation, malformation, or defect in one of the fetuses that is not surgically 
correctable (like a cleft palate). Should the Gestational Carrier become pregnant with 
more than 2 healthy fetuses, which is not at all likely as only one embryo is to be 
transferred at a time, the Parties, along with the Parties attending physician will make a 
determination regarding reduction at that time. The Gestational Carrier will not carry 
more than two fetuses. The Parties acknowledge their understanding that selective 
reduction could pose a risk to the continuing pregnancy, including causing the loss of the 
entire pregnancy, and all Parties assume this risk. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing section, all Parties, and specifically the Intended Parents, 
acknowledge their understanding that a pregnant woman has an absolute Constitutional 
right to abort or not abort any fetus she is carrying, regardless of the fact that she may not 
be the genetic parent of such Child, and that any promise to the contrary is unenforceable.  
All Parties also acknowledge that the Gestational Carrier has a right to make a 
determination regarding whether or not to reduce any pregnancy she is carrying 
regardless of the terms herein and that any promise to the contrary is unenforceable. 
However, it is the Parties’ intention and they agree at the time of signing this Agreement 
that they intend to perform as specifically stated herein and such terms are material. 
 84 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (where same-sex 
couples brought action challenging the constitutionality of state laws banning same-sex 
marriages or refusal to recognize same-sex marriages); Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 
(2017) (where two same-sex couples challenged the constitutionally of a birth-certificate 
law, as applied). 
 85 See LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2718.1(6) (2016) (defining intended parents as a married 
couple who “each exclusively contribute their own gametes to create their embryo”). 
 86 See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (West 2019). 
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married to each other.”87 As a consequence of such laws, same-sex 
couples were not recognized as the legal parents of a child resulting from 
a surrogacy arrangement. That changed in 2015 when the Supreme Court 
declared in Obergefell that state laws barring same-sex marriages were 
unconstitutional.88 As a result of the Court’s ruling in Obergefell, same-
sex marriages are legally recognized in all states, including Virginia and 
others that refused to extend marriage equality to same-sex couples.89 
In 2017, Pavan v. Smith90 extended the holding of Obergefell91 to 
issues more directly related to surrogacy. Pavon involved two same-sex 
couples: Leah and Jana Jacobs, and Terrah and Marisa Pavan.92  Leah 
Jacobs and Terrah Pavan each gave birth to a child and listed their 
respective spouses as the parents on the birth certificate paperwork.93 
However, the Arkansas Department of Health only included the birth 
mother’s name on the certificate, citing an Arkansas state law.94 The 
Arkansas law required a child’s birth certificate to list the male spouse of 
the biological mother, regardless of his biological relationship to the 
child.95 However, the state did not extend that rule to same-sex couples, 
thus, preventing biological mothers and fathers from listing their same-
sex spouses on birth certificates.96 The central question presented in 
Pavan was if it was unconstitutional for states to prevent same-sex 
spouses from being listed on a birth certificate if that same right is 
afforded to heterosexual couples.97 The court answered in the 
affirmative, explaining that state laws that treat same-sex couples 
differently than heterosexual couples are unconstitutional and 
inconsistent with the Court’s ruling in Obergefell.98 
The Court’s decision in Pavan is important to surrogacy because 
many same-sex couples use surrogacy to form their families. Pavan 
paves the way for intended parents to list their same-sex spouses on their 
child’s birth certificate, even if their spouse is not genetically related to 
                                                                                                                                     
 87 Id.; As of June 2018, there is proposed legislation to change the definition of 
“intended parents” to mean a “married couple,” rather than “a man and a woman.” See 
2018 VA SB 612. 
 88 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017). 
 91 See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct at 644. 
 92 Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2076. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077 (discussing ARK. CODE ANN. 20-18-401). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017). 
 98 Id. 
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the child resulting from a gestational surrogacy agreement. In light of 
Obergefell and Pavan, state laws that treat same-sex couples differently 
than heterosexual couples may be deemed unconstitutional. To prevent 
lawsuits and other legal ramifications, state legislatures (such as 
Virginia) have considered changes to surrogacy laws to cure 
constitutional infirmities.99 Going forward, laws that restrict the practice 
of surrogacy should apply equally to same-sex and heterosexual couples. 
Although none of these cases directly involve surrogacy, they 
involve issues that are intricately intertwined with the practice of 
surrogacy. Practitioners and lawmakers should keep these holdings in 
mind when drafting surrogacy agreements, laws, and regulations. 
3. Statutes Governing Surrogacy Agreements 
No federal laws or regulations govern surrogacy in the U.S. 
Consequently, each state employs its own approach, resulting in 
inconsistencies in the practice and enforcement of surrogacy agreements. 
Statutes governing surrogacy fall into four categories of statutes: (1) 
those that permit surrogacy contract enforcement; (2) those that permit 
surrogacy contract enforcement, but with significant restrictions; (3) 
those that civilly or criminally prohibit surrogacy agreement 
enforcement; and (4) those that are silent on the issue of surrogacy.100 
California falls within the first category by explicitly declaring that 
gestational surrogacy agreements are “presumptively valid and shall not 
be rescinded or revoked without a court order.”101 Texas and Virginia fall 
within the second category by only enforcing surrogacy agreements 
commissioned by married couples.102  States within the third category 
include New York and Michigan,103 which treat surrogacy contracts as 
“void and unenforceable,” contrary to public policy.104 Fourth, and 
                                                                                                                                     
 99 Supra note 87, at 2078 
 100 See Morrissey, supra note 2, at 503. 
 101 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(i). (“An assisted reproduction agreement for gestational 
carriers executed in accordance with this section is presumptively valid and shall not be 
rescinded or revoked without a court order. For purposes of this part, any failure to 
comply with the requirements of this section shall rebut the presumption of the validity of 
the assisted reproduction agreement for gestational carriers.”). 
 102 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754 (West); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (West). 
 103 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859 (West). (Surrogacy is criminalized under 
Michigan law. Michigan Surrogate Parenting Act provides that, “[a] person other than a 
participating party who induces, arranges, procures, or otherwise assists in the formation 
of a surrogate parentage contract for compensation is guilty of a felony punishable by a 
fine of not more than $50,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both.”). 
 104 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West); N.Y. DOMESTIC REL. LAW § 122 
(McKinney 2021). 
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finally, states such as Mississippi have neither statutory nor case law 
regarding the enforcement of surrogacy agreements.105 
Inconsistent approaches to the treatment of surrogacy agreements 
are due, in part, to public policy concerns discussed in Johnson106 
regarding the potential impact of surrogacy on women, family relations, 
and children. The previously discussed statutes are the legislatures’ 
varying attempts at addressing these concerns. However, the prevalence 
of cross-state surrogacy transactions and forum shopping has propelled 
the need for a uniform approach to the legal treatment of surrogacy 
agreements.107 
III. THE UPA AND THE ENFORCEABILITY OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY 
CONTRACT PROVISIONS 
A uniform approach to surrogacy was introduced in 2000 with the 
promulgation of the UPA (2000). Section III.A discusses the evolution of 
the UPA through its current 2017 version. In an effort to guide drafting 
practices, Section III.B evaluates the enforceability of gestational 
surrogacy agreement provisions under the UPA (2017). 
A. The Uniform Parentage Act 
The UPA was revised to reflect changes in society and technology. 
The following sections discuss the history of the UPA and highlight 
some key changes to the UPA over the years. 
1. Pre-UPA and the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 
In response to a series of Supreme Court decisions,108 the ULC 
promulgated the UPA, which focused on creating a modern civil 
paternity action for determining the natural father of any child and 
eliminating any distinctions between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” 
children.109 Prior to its promulgation in 1973, a child born to an 
unmarried mother was ‘illegitimate’ under the common law.110 The 
                                                                                                                                     
 105 See Gestational Surrogacy in Mississippi, CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS, 
https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map/mississippi/ (last 
visited Aug. 13, 2018). 
 106 See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
 107 See Caitlin Conklin, Note, Simply Inconsistent: Surrogacy Laws in the United 
States and the Pressing Need for Regulation, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 67 (2013). 
 108 See e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 
(1968). 
 109 See generally Uniform Parentage Act § 2 cmt. (1973). 
 110 See Parentage Act Summary, ULC (May 27, 2015), http://lgbtbar.org/annual/wp-
content/uploads/sites/7/2015/05/10-Parentage-Act-Summary.pdf. 
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common law placed harsh penalties on illegitimate children by denying 
them inheritance and property rights.111 Additionally, biological fathers 
of illegitimate children were not afforded parental rights and were not 
burdened with parental obligations.112 The legal status of illegitimate 
children changed in 1968 after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Levy v. 
Louisiana.113 In Levy, the Court held a statute construed as denying a 
right to recovery based on a child’s status as an illegitimate child was a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.114  The original goal of the UPA (1973) was to provide a 
legal relationship between natural parents and their children regardless of 
marital status.115 Given its narrow scope, the UPA (1973) did not address 
surrogacy. As of 2000, nineteen states enacted the 1973 version of the 
UPA.116 
2. The Uniform Parentage Act of 2002 
The ULC revised the UPA in 2000 in light of technological 
advancements in the area of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”). 
The UPA (2000) was broader in scope than its predecessor, incorporating 
and replacing the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act 
(“USCACA”) and Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act 
(“UPUFA”).117 Further changes were made to the UPA (2000) after 
objections from the American Bar Association that there were 
discrepancies in the 2000 version between the treatment of children of 
unmarried parents and children of married parents.118 The ULC 
responded by further updating the UPA in 2002, resulting in the UPA 
(2002). The 2002 version of the UPA included: provisions regarding 
genetic testing, provisions permitting a non-judicial acknowledgment of 
paternity, and rules for determining the parent-child relationship for 
children who were conceived through ART. 
One of the most progressive changes to the UPA was the addition 
of Article 8 authorizing traditional and gestational surrogacy agreements. 
The 2002 version of the UPA adopted a procedurally intensive model 
that required contracting parties to go through a pre-conception process 
                                                                                                                                     
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See generally Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 114 Id. 
 115 See generally Uniform Parentage Act § 2 cmt. (1973). 
 116 See Uniform Parentage Act (2002). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
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in which the parties petitioned the court to validate the agreement.119 In 
order for the agreement to be validated following elements needed to be 
met: (1) the contents of the agreement must adhere to statutory 
requirements; (2) parties must petition the court to commence a 
proceeding to validate the agreement; and (3) parties must participate in 
a hearing where the court makes a determination regarding the validity of 
the gestational agreement and whether the intended parents should be 
declared the legal parents of the child.120 
As of July 2017, only Texas and Utah have enacted the UPA 
(2002)’s surrogacy provisions.121 Overall, eleven states adopted the 2002 
version of UPA; with at least five states adopting non-uniform surrogacy 
provisions.122 Objections from both anti- and pro-surrogacy camps 
hampered legislative enactment. Some resisted the UPA’s legitimizing of 
still-controversial surrogacy agreements, and others objected to its 
procedurally intensive model for that legitimization. The UPA (2002) 
was likely too pro-surrogacy for states that were obstructive towards the 
practice of surrogacy, by providing a pathway to parenthood through the 
legal recognition of surrogacy agreements where surrogates were paid 
for their services. Conversely, the 2002 version’s statutory framework 
for the legal recognition of surrogacy agreements was likely too 
burdensome for states that were supportive of the practice of surrogacy. 
3. Uniform Parentage Act of 2017 
The ULC tried again to achieve uniformity and reflect changes in 
law, technology, and surrogacy practice with the 2017 revision of the 
UPA. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell123 and 
Pavan,124 the 2017 version of the UPA ensures equal treatment of 
children of same-sex couples. It also adopted gender-neutral terms such 
as “individual,” in place of “father” or “mother.” Most important for 
present purposes, the recent changes to the UPA provide a uniformed and 
modernized statutory framework for the establishment of parent-child 
relationships between intended parents and children resulting from 
surrogacy agreements. 
The 2017 version of the UPA streamlines the gestational surrogacy 
process. Previously, the UPA provided the same rules for gestational and 
                                                                                                                                     
 119 See generally Uniform Parentage Act § 801-805 (2002) 
 120 Id. 
 121 See Uniform Parentage Act, art. 8 cmt. (2017). 
 122 Id.  
 123 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 124 See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017). 
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traditional surrogacy by requiring parties to get their surrogacy 
agreements approved by a court through a petitioning process.125 The 
2017 version of the UPA dispensed of the pre-conception petition model 
for gestational surrogacy agreements.  As long as the UPA (2017)’s 
statutory requirements are met, intended parents are now treated as the 
legal parents of a child, without having to go through the court 
petitioning process.126 The UPA (2017) provides for a different legal 
treatment for traditional surrogacy. The UPA (2017)’s approach to 
traditional surrogacy agreements is similar to the pre-conception process 
outlined in the UPA (2002) for both gestational and traditional surrogacy 
agreements.127 The UPA (2017) also allows for the termination of 
traditional surrogacy agreements by the surrogate within seventy-two 
hours of childbirth.128 As of July 2018, only Vermont and Washington 
had enacted the most recent version of the UPA, and it had been 
introduced in Rhode Island and California.129 
B. Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contract Provisions under 
the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act 
As more jurisdictions begin to adopt the UPA (2017), it is 
imperative to evaluate and augment current drafting practices to ensure 
the enforceability of surrogacy agreements. The following section 
provides an overview of the contents of gestational surrogacy 
agreements. The sections that follow evaluate the legality of current 
drafting practices under the UPA (2017)’s surrogacy provisions, 
                                                                                                                                     
 125 See, Uniform Parentage Act § 802-803 (2002). 
 126 Uniform Parentage Act § 802 (2017). (“(a) To execute an agreement to act as a 
gestational or genetic surrogate, a woman must: (1) have attained 21 years of age; (2) 
previously have given birth to at least one child; (3) complete a medical evaluation 
related to the surrogacy arrangement by a licensed medical doctor; (4) complete a mental-
health consultation by a licensed mental-health professional; and (5) have independent 
legal representation of her choice throughout the surrogacy arrangement regarding the 
terms of the surrogacy agreement and the potential legal consequences of the agreement. 
(b) To execute a surrogacy agreement, each intended parent, whether or not genetically 
related to the child, must: (1) have attained 21 years of age; (2) complete a medical 
evaluation related to the surrogacy arrangement by a licensed medical doctor; (3) 
complete a mental-health consultation by a licensed mental health professional; and (4) 
have independent legal representation of the intended parent’s choice throughout the 
surrogacy arrangement regarding the terms of the surrogacy agreement and the potential 
legal consequences of the agreement.”). 
 127 Uniform Parentage Act § 813-15 (2017). 
 128 Uniform Parentage Act § 814 (2017). 
 129 Enactment Map, ULC, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-
home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f (last visited July 10, 
2018). 
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constitutional law, and contract law principles. Additionally, each 
evaluation is coupled with recommendations for adjustments to drafting 
practices to ensure that surrogacy agreements are compliant with the 
UPA (2017). 
1. Overview of Gestational Surrogacy Agreements 
Four surrogacy agreements provide the source material for this 
section.130  Two attorneys who represent intended parents and surrogates 
in Maryland, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania use these agreements. 
While the agreements vary, this review focuses on the commonalities 
since they may well be present in other surrogacy agreements. 
Surrogacy agreements must reflect the state law that governs, but 
they tend to contain some relatively standard clauses. These clauses fall 
into seven categories: (1) representations or factual promises regarding 
the present or past; (2) covenants regarding the surrogate’s behavior; (3) 
compensation to the surrogate and agency, including reimbursements and 
financing; (4) decision-making regarding abortion or reduction of 
multiples; (5) breaches and remedies; (6) confidentiality; and (7) 
consequences of the separation, death, or divorce of intended parents.131 
Due to space limitations, this paper focuses on behavior; finance; 
abortion and reduction; separation and death provisions; and the 
enforceability of those provisions under the statutory framework of the 
UPA (2017), constitutional law, and contract law principles. 
2. Behavior Provisions 
Parents usually make lifestyle changes during pregnancy. Naturally, 
some intended parents expect surrogates to make similar changes during 
the pregnancy period. Behavior provisions are used in surrogacy 
agreements as a way for intended parents to exert control over 
surrogates’ conduct during pregnancy.132 Provisions regarding behaviors 
may include guidelines regarding communication, restrictions on sexual 
activities, and requirements regarding physical exercise.133  Some 
agreements place limitations on the kind of foods surrogates may 
                                                                                                                                     
 130 The sample agreements used as the source for this information are available on file 
with the author. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Hillary L. Berk, The Legalization of Emotion: Managing Risk by Managing 
Feelings in Contracts for Surrogate Labor, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143, 157-59 (Mar. 
2015). 
 133 Id. 
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consume and prohibitions on activities, such as microwave use.134 One 
contract required that the surrogate, “abstain from any sexual conduct 
which may result in contraction of a sexually transmitted disease.”135 
Another contract prohibited the surrogate from engaging in sexual 
conduct during the third trimester of pregnancy.136 The diet and exercise 
routine of surrogates is also a concern for intended parents. One contract 
provided that the surrogate should “refrain from strenuous exercise, to 
the extent that exercise is contrary to her attending physicians’ 
advice.”137 Another contract was more invasive, requiring the surrogate 
to engage in acupuncture.138 
The UPA (2017) section 804(a)(7) may limit the ability of intended 
parents to include lifestyle restrictions in surrogacy agreements.139 The 
first sentence in section 804(a)(7) provides that “[t]he agreement must 
permit the surrogate to make all health and welfare decisions regarding 
herself and her pregnancy.”140 In light of this section, provisions limiting 
the sexual conduct, diet, and exercise of the surrogate may be 
unenforceable, if construed as a “health and welfare” limitation. 
Surrogacy agreements may still outline the expectations of intended 
parents as it pertains to the surrogate’s health and welfare. However, the 
agreement should also acknowledge that it is within the surrogate’s sole 
discretion to abide by such expectations. Lifestyle restrictions may also 
be unenforceable on contract law grounds. Lifestyle restrictions that 
dictate a surrogate’s ability to get a manicure141 or the number of times a 
surrogate engages in sexual conduct may be deemed unconscionable by 
the courts and thus unenforceable. 
There are also contract law considerations. Such provisions may be 
deemed to be an unduly restriction on a surrogate’s autonomy and 
therefore unconscionable. Some scholars argue that lifestyle restrictions 
are analogous to involuntary servitude.142 Proponents of this argument 
contend that, much like slaves, surrogates do not have autonomy over 
their bodies; instead, their bodies (or more specifically, wombs) are 
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 135 See Enactment Map, supra note 129. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See generally Uniform Parentage Act §804(a)(7) (2017). 
 140 Id. 
 141 See Enactment Map, supra note 129. 
 142 See generally Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership of Life, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139 (1990). 
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controlled by the intended parents.143 Arguments against the 
enforceability of lifestyle restrictions based on unconscionability are 
unlikely to succeed. First, proponents of this argument often ignore an 
essential difference between the lack of autonomy that may be involved 
in a surrogacy arrangement and slavery: choice. Slaves were either born 
or sold into slavery and therefore were never given a choice regarding 
the relinquishment of their autonomy. In contrast, surrogates in the U.S. 
voluntarily enter into surrogacy arrangements. By entering into a 
surrogacy contract, a surrogate makes the choice to relinquish some 
control of her body for a set period of time. Not only is this choice 
voluntary, but it is also negotiable. Surrogates are free to negotiate the 
type and amount of autonomy they are willing to relinquish. 
3. Finance Provisions 
Provisions relating to financing during the surrogacy process 
usually concern the compensation, reimbursement, and health insurance 
coverage of the surrogate’s expenses incurred as a result of the surrogacy 
arrangement. The UPA (2017) permits compensated surrogacy and 
provides guidelines for payments made to surrogates and the use of the 
surrogate’s health insurance plan to cover medical expenses.144 
i. Compensation & Reimbursements 
Surrogates incur significant medical, legal, and living expenses 
during the surrogacy process. The gestational surrogacy agreements in 
my sample provided for the reimbursement of such expenses; carefully 
noting that such reimbursements do not constitute compensation for 
services or the relinquishment of parental rights.145 The term 
“compensation” is rarely used in surrogacy agreements.146 Instead, 
payments made to surrogates and their spouses are often construed as 
                                                                                                                                     
 143 Id. 
 144 See generally Uniform Parentage Act §804 (2017). 
 145 For example, the sample finance provision in one agreement provided: 
It is expressly understood and agreed that reimbursements for expenses for legal, 
medical, psychological and psychiatric expenses, and other miscellaneous expenses, paid 
on behalf of the Gestational Carrier as described herein shall in no way be construed as a 
fee for termination of parental rights or a payment in exchange for the placement of the 
Child with the Intended Parents. 
All payments made pursuant to this Agreement are to be deemed reimbursements or 
payments for reasonable medical and ancillary costs and expenses including reasonable 
household and living expenses. Consequently, no payments shall be construed as fees or 
compensation for services. 
 146 See supra note 83. 
2021]Gestational Surrogacy Under the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act 23 
reimbursements for medical, living, and other ancillary expenses. This is 
done to avoid the tax implications of directly compensating surrogates 
for their services. One portion of an agreement stated: 
[I]t is expressly understood and agreed that reimbursements for 
expenses for legal, medical, psychological and psychiatric 
expenses, and other miscellaneous expenses, paid on behalf of 
the gestational carrier as described herein shall in no way be 
construed as a fee for termination of parental rights or a payment 
in exchange for the placement of the child with the intended 
parents. [. . .] [A]ll payments under this agreement are to be 
construed solely as reimbursements, and therefore not subject to 
taxation. 
The exclusion of contract provisions regarding compensation for 
surrogacy services from surrogacy agreements may also be a reflection 
of current state laws. Some jurisdictions prohibit surrogates and intended 
parents from entering into surrogacy agreements by which the surrogate 
is being compensated for her services.147 Such laws are enacted, in part, 
to prevent the creation of a “baby-selling” market.148 
The UPA (2017) sections 804(a)(6) and 804(b)(1)-(2) provide 
guidelines regarding payments made to surrogates.149 Section 804(a)(6) 
provides that surrogacy agreements must disclose “how each intended 
parent will cover the surrogacy–related expenses of the surrogate and the 
medical expenses of the child.”150 Additionally, section 804(b) authorizes 
compensated surrogacy by permitting “payments of consideration and 
reasonable expenses” to surrogates.151 Existing drafting practices 
regarding surrogacy payments would remain fairly unaffected under the 
UPA (2017). If enacted, attorneys in jurisdictions, such as California,152 
that currently permit compensated surrogacy can continue to use contract 
language similar to the language quoted above. Jurisdictions, such as 
New York,153 that currently prohibit compensated surrogacy must 
include contract language to outline how the intended parents will 
reimburse the surrogate for expenses incurred during the arrangement 
and how, if at all, the surrogate will be compensated for her services. 
                                                                                                                                     
 147 See e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855. 
 148 See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (Harv. Univ. 
Press 1st ed., 1996). 
 149 Uniform Parentage Act §804 (2017). 
 150 Uniform Parentage Act §804(a)(6) (2017). 
 151 Uniform Parentage Act §804(a)(7) (2017). 
 152 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(a)(4) (West). 
 153 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(1) (McKinney). 
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Given the tax implications, it seems unlikely that practitioners will 
augment contract language to include provisions regarding payments to 
surrogates for their services, making the UPA (2017)’s permissive 
approach to compensated surrogacy unavailing. 
There are also contract law considerations when evaluating the 
enforceability of payment provisions in surrogacy agreements. 
Opponents to the practice of surrogacy have argued against the 
enforcement of compensated surrogacy agreements based on public 
policy grounds.154 Some fear that the exchange of surrogacy services for 
compensation will transform the procreation of children into a 
commercial enterprise, thus creating a baby-selling market.155 The court 
in Johnson v. Calvert rejected this argument by pointing out the lack of 
data to support this proposition.156 Logical reasoning also illustrates why 
this proposition does not hold true. Gestational surrogacy has not and is 
unlikely to result in the commodification of children because intended 
parents are not paying for children. Instead, intended parents compensate 
surrogates for their service and pregnancy-related expenses.157 In light of 
the foregoing reasons, public policy arguments against the enforcement 
of surrogacy payment provisions are unlikely to succeed. 
ii. Health Insurance 
Surrogates are not typically reimbursed for all medical expenses. 
Surrogates are expected to utilize their health insurance, if available, to 
cover medical expenses.158 Intended parents are expected to reimburse 
the surrogate for medical expenses to the extent that those expenses are 
not covered by the surrogate’s health insurance. One sample agreement 
included a clause that stated: 
[G]estational carrier confirms that she has a personal 
comprehensive health insurance policy [. . .] in place which, to 
the best of her knowledge, will cover the cost associated with her 
pregnancy, labor and delivery. 
                                                                                                                                     
 154 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (the Court addressed the 
commodification argument by noting that no evidence was offered to support it). 
 155 See generally Radin, supra note 148. 
 156 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
 157 See generally Enactment Map, supra note 129. 
 158 Id.; see also HEATHER JACOBSON, LABOR OF LOVE: GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AND 
THE WORK OF MAKING BABIES (Naomi R. Gerstel et al. eds., 2016). 
2021]Gestational Surrogacy Under the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act 25 
Some health insurers have resisted this practice.159 However, health 
insurance policies remain one of the primary ways of covering the costs 
of surrogacy in the U.S. 
The UPA (2017) section 804(a)(6) governs the inclusion of health 
insurance provisions in surrogacy agreements.160 The section provides 
that surrogacy agreements “must include a summary of the health-care 
policy provisions related to coverage for surrogate pregnancy,” if the 
surrogate’s health insurance is used to cover medical expenses.161 The 
section also requires that “any possible liability of the surrogate, third-
party-liability liens, other insurance coverage, and any notice 
requirement that could affect coverage or liability of the surrogate,” must 
be disclosed.162 Each agreement in the sample required the use of the 
surrogate’s health insurance plan to cover medical expenses. However, 
none of the agreements summarized or included any information 
regarding the surrogate’s health insurance policy and the coverage 
available under the policy.163 Assuming the sample agreements are 
representative of standard drafting practices, existing surrogacy 
agreements will not be enforceable under section 804(a)(6). Attorneys 
must adjust drafting practices to include a summary of the surrogate’s 
health insurance coverage. 
4. Abortion and Selective Reduction Provisions 
Significantly more controversial than compensation provisions are 
abortion provisions. Abortion provisions are intended to provide 
intended parents with the option of terminating the pregnancy in the 
event of multiple fetuses or medical issues. One sample agreement 
provided that the surrogate agrees: 
[N]ot to abort the pregnancy except for medical reasons placing 
the [her] life or health at risk, if recommended by the attending 
OB/GYN physician and only after prior consultation with the 
                                                                                                                                     
 159 See e.g., Mid-South Ins. Co. v. Doe, 274 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D.S.C. 2003)  (where 
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intended parents unless a medical emergency prevents such prior 
consultation.164 
The agreement also stated that the surrogate “agrees to undergo an 
abortion at the request of the intended parents” if it is determined that 
there may be a risk to the child’s health or identified a very low IQ 
mental deficiency.165 The effectiveness of the previously mentioned 
clauses is limited because surrogacy agreements generally acknowledge 
the right of the surrogate to terminate or continue the pregnancy, while 
providing remedies for intended parents if the surrogate decides to 
continue or terminate a pregnancy against the wishes of the intended 
parents.166  One agreement provided that “if the gestational carrier aborts 
the fetus contrary to the medical opinion as defined above and contrary 
to the desires of the intended parents, the gestational carrier agrees to pay 
to the intended parents a sum of money equal to the expenses already 
paid by the intended parents.”167 
Abortion provisions have constitutional implications. As a result of 
Roe (which held that a woman’s right to privacy included the right to 
terminate her pregnancy), surrogacy agreements acknowledge the right 
of the surrogate to terminate or continue the pregnancy.168 Any attempt to 
force a surrogate to terminate or continue a pregnancy would be 
inconsistent with the principles of Roe. 
The UPA (2017) sections 804(a)(5) and 804(a)(7) also govern the 
inclusion of abortion provisions in surrogacy agreements.169 In relevant 
part, section 804(a)(5) provides that the intended parents “will assume 
responsibility for the financial support of the child, regardless of number 
of children born or gender or mental or physical condition of each 
child.”170 Section 804(a)(5) has important implications regarding the 
enforceability of abortion provisions and the remedies available to 
intended parents. Even if intended parents request that the surrogate 
undergo an abortion, as provided for in the sample agreement, the 
intended parents will remain financially responsible for the child if the 
surrogate does comply with the request. Intended parents should 
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carefully select their surrogate candidates, giving careful consideration to 
a surrogate’s willingness to undergo an abortion. Section 804(a)(7) 
compliments section 804(a)(5) by reinforcing a surrogate’s constitutional 
right to continue or terminate the pregnancy.171 Section 804(a)(7) 
provides: 
[T]he agreement must permit the surrogate to make all health and 
welfare decisions regarding herself and her pregnancy. This [act] 
does not enlarge or diminish the surrogate’s right to terminate her 
pregnancy.172 
Section 804(a)(7) will have little to no impact on drafting practices 
because, as previously discussed, abortion provisions generally 
acknowledge the surrogate’s constitutional right to terminate or maintain 
the pregnancy while outlining the conditions and expectations in the 
event that the intended parents or surrogate does decide to terminate the 
pregnancy. 
5. Provisions Regarding the Separation, Divorce, Incapacitation, or 
Death of Intended Parents 
In addition to governing the relationship between surrogates and 
intended parents, gestational surrogacy agreements may provide 
guidelines for the determination of parentage in the event of unforeseen 
circumstances, such as divorce or death. Parentage provisions are 
important in surrogacy agreements because they reduce ambiguity 
regarding parentage, thus reducing the need for litigation. 
Some surrogacy agreements detail the procedures for carrying out 
or terminating the agreement in the event that the intended parents 
become separated, divorced, incapacitated, or deceased prior to or after 
the embryo transfer. Generally, surrogacy agreements are deemed null 
and void if the separation, divorce, incapacitation, or death of the 
intended parent occurs prior to embryo transfer.173 If separation or 
divorce occurs after the embryo transfer, some surrogacy agreements 
provide that the parentage of the child is determined pursuant to a 
custody agreement or a court order.174 If incapacitation or death occurs 
after the embryo transfer, either intended parent may agree to proceed 
with the agreement.175 If both intended parents are deceased, surrogacy 
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agreements typically provide that the parentage of the child is determined 
according to the last will and testament of the intended parents or by the 
parentage laws of the governing state.176 
i. Separation or Divorce 
With a significant number of U.S. marriages ending in divorce,177 
surrogacy agreements must account for the possibility that the intended 
parents’ marriage may dissolve before, during, or after the embryo is 
implanted in the surrogate. 
The UPA (2002) did not explicitly address the parentage of a child 
if the intended parents divorced or died during the arrangement. To 
provide clarity regarding this issue, the UPA (2017) sections 805, 809, 
and 810 address the parentage of a child resulting from a surrogacy 
arrangement when the intended parents are divorced or deceased.178 
Section 805 also addresses the impact of a subsequent marriage on the 
surrogacy agreement. Section 805(b)(2) provides: 
[T]he divorce, dissolution, annulment, declaration of invalidity, 
legal separation, or separate maintenance of an intended parent 
after the agreement is signed by all parties does not affect the 
validity of the agreement.179 
In other words, a change in the relationship status between the 
intended parents does not change their legal status as a parent of a child 
resulting from a surrogacy agreement. Additionally, section 805(b)(1) 
provides that the subsequent marriage of an intended parent “does not 
affect the validity of a surrogacy agreement,” and the spouse of the 
intended parent is not the parent of the child resulting from the 
agreement.180 The parentage of a child whose intended parents separate181 
during or after the pregnancy is an important legal issue that has been 
litigated. Such cases usually concern a dispute between former spouses 
regarding custody and financial support for a child resulting from a 
surrogacy agreement.182 The inclusion of section 805(b) reduces 
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ambiguity regarding parentage in the event of separation by affirming the 
validity of the agreement.183 Notably, section 805 is a default provision 
that only applies if the surrogacy agreement fails to address the issue of 
separation. 
While the UPA (2017) does provide a baseline for determining 
parentage, it does not provide clarity regarding the specific duties and 
responsibilities of each parent. To avoid future disputes, attorneys should 
carefully consider potential conflicts that may arise as a result of the 
separation of the intended parents. Surrogacy agreements should include 
a custody arrangement (or guidelines for determining custody) and 
provisions regarding financial support for a child resulting from a 
surrogacy agreement. 
ii. Incapacitation or Death 
A custody arrangement may also be beneficial in the event of the 
death or incapacitation of the intended parents. Considering death in the 
midst of preparing an agreement to create life may be daunting and 
uncomfortable. However, the death of an intended parent may have 
serious inheritance and custody implications. Therefore, it is important 
for intended parents to solidify their postmortem wishes in the surrogacy 
agreement or a will. 
The addition of the UPA (2017) section 810 has significant drafting 
implications for attorneys. First, as a threshold matter, section 809 
declares that each intended parent is the parent of a child conceived 
under a gestational surrogacy agreement.184 Under section 810, the 
intended parent is still the parent of the child even if the parent dies while 
the surrogate is pregnant.185 However, section 810 also provides that an 
intended parent is not the parent of a child resulting from a surrogacy 
arrangement if the intended parent dies before the transfer of an embryo 
unless: 
(1) the agreement provides otherwise; and 
(2) the transfer of a gamete or embryo occurs not later than [36] 
months after the death of the intended parent or birth of the child 
occurs not later than [45] months after the death of the intended 
parent.186 
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Under the default rules of the UPA (2017), an intended parent who 
dies prior to the embryo transplant may not be the parent of a child who 
results from a surrogacy arrangement, even if the child is genetically 
related to the deceased parent. The default rules have serious 
implications on the child’s inheritance rights and the order of parentage. 
Intended parents can avoid the potential impact of the UPA (2017)’s 
default rules by addressing the parentage of a deceased intended parent 
within the surrogacy agreement. However, an intended parent who dies 
prior to the embryo transfer may still lack parental rights even if an 
agreement provides otherwise. Section 810’s requirements to avoid the 
default rules of the UPA (2017) are conjunctive, meaning that the 
agreement must address the parentage of a deceased parent and the 
embryo transfer or the childbirth must occur within the time period 
allotted in the UPA (2017) section 810.187 
Notably, the UPA (2017) does not address the issue of both 
intended parents dying during the surrogacy arrangement, nor does it 
address the issue of incapacitation. Drafting attorneys should include 
surrogacy agreement provisions that address parentage and how the 
surrogacy arrangement should proceed if both intended parents die or if 
one or both parents become incapacitated. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If adopted by state legislatures, the UPA (2017) will result in 
moderate changes to the drafting practices in gestational surrogacy 
agreements. Attorneys will need to augment their drafting practices to 
ensure that behavior provisions do not hinder the surrogate’s statutory 
right to make all decisions concerning her health and welfare. Like 
before, attorneys should also consider the unconscionability of 
behavioral provisions. The UPA permits compensated surrogacy and 
attorneys may freely include contract provisions regarding payments to 
the surrogate for her services.  
The UPA also includes provisions regarding the use of health 
insurance policies to cover medical expenses. Attorneys must include a 
summary of the health insurance coverage to remain in compliance with 
the UPA (2017). Abortion provision drafting practices will remain 
unchanged. As usual, attorneys must acknowledge the surrogate’s right 
to continue or terminate her pregnancy. The UPA’s provisions regarding 
the separation or death of intended parents will have minimal impact on 
drafting practices because the provisions do not dictate what should be 
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included in the surrogacy agreement. However, if the parties wish to 
avoid the default rules of the UPA, attorneys must include provisions 
regarding separation and death. Overall, the statutory scheme of the UPA 
(2017) may bring uniformity to a developing area while codifying and 
streamlining existing drafting practices. 
 
